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Law on the Street:
Legal Narrative and
the Street Law Classroom
Elizabeth L. MacDowell
Every new and important understanding or
insight that I have reached and found a way to
articulate in my writing has come from dialogue
with my students. ...
L Introduction
This essay is about the disassociation of law from context-
and therefore, from the people it is most directly designed to
benefit-that can happen in the classroom, and why that matters.
For the purposes of this essay I will discuss two types of classrooms:
the law school classroom (including, but not limited to my own
school, Boalt Hall), and the inner-city high school classroom,
where I taught Street Law during the fall semester of my third
year. As this suggests, this essay is also a reflection on my own law
school experience, a making sense of the process and meaning of
becoming a "person of the law."2 Thus, it is appropriate to begin
with how my law school experience brought me to Street Law.
I was one of those students who was miserable in the first year
of law school-not because of all the reasons people who don't go
1. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholar-
ship as Struggle, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT 336, 337 (Kimbert6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (hereinafter,
Word).
2. I thank my professor, Linda Hamilton Krieger, for this phrase.
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to law school assume, but because it was for me a kind of spirit
death. As if that was not bad enough, I could not understand what
in the law school environment was causing my misery. By the end
of that year, I was obsessed with figuring out what had happened
to me, and to so many friends who had also suffered during their
law school years. What was the seemingly invisible force that did
such damage? How could it even be described? One friend, out
of school and practicing for nearly twenty years, still riled at the
discussion of her painful law school experience. "There just aren't
words for it," she repeated over and over. Hearing this, I decided
that I would remember everything people told me about their law
school experience and write it down, and for a while I did. I saw
this project as a kind of post-apocalypse record keeping.
Interestingly, many of the stories I collected not only
described losing the ability to speak, but used metaphors of
eating, swallowing, and indigestion to describe or explain the
painful psychological effects of law school. One friend's use of
the eating metaphor was particularly interesting to me. According
to my friend, the trouble with law school could be traced to the
legal text itself. "You can't eat it!" she exclaimed. "It cannot be
integrated with your intellectual, spiritual, experiential self." The
resulting alienation, to her, was akin to a profound indigestion.
You just can't eat it.
Eventually, this urgency of articulating what the "invisible"
problem of law school was about faded. Focused more on achieving
some type of meaningful engagement (and mental health), I
determined to seek out points of contact within the education
process where I might renegotiate the relationship between myself,
law school, and what it might mean to be a lawyer. It was in this
context that I signed up for a clinical program called Street Law:
a national program, administered through local law schools, that
Vol. 9:2
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places second and third year law students in inner-city junior high
and high schools and within juvenile facilities to teach a course
in "practical law." The curriculum for my semester, for example,
included a general introduction to the legal system, and criminal,
family, housing, and consumer law.
The Street Law program appealed to me because I thought it
would provide a powerful reality check in terms of connecting as a
law student with a community far from the law school classroom.
It also fit with my conception of one of the meaningful things I
could do as a lawyer: obtain important, specialized knowledge,
associated with power, and make it available to people who
otherwise lacked access. My instinct was that such transmission
of information was empowering, in and of itself. Ironically, I did
not think about the fact that receiving legal information had, at
least initially, been distinctly disempowering for me and many
people I knew.
I was assigned to teach Street Law to a class of juniors and
seniors at Castlemont High School in Oakland. Our classroom
was located in a portable at the rear of the campus. It was one
of a dozen or so classrooms, mostly unused, which lay beyond
the main campus area, separated from the rest of campus by a
high cyclone fence. After the late bell, that twenty foot fence
was padlocked shut, and there was no direct route to the main
building. Physically separated from the heart of campus, the
isolation was intensified by the fact that no administrators or
security ventured back to the area of my portable. Indeed, my
supervising teacher told me that no one from administration had
visited her portable-even to observe her teaching-in her four
years at Castlemont.
2008
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The lack of supervision, and tension among the students
(including interrelated gang and racial conflicts), corresponded
with regular outbreaks of violence in the area where my classroom
was located. Frequently the lights went out. There was no heat.
Sometimes, standing in that portable, attempting to lecture to my
students in the near-darkness, the air was so thick with depression
and futility I could hardly speak. I could feel each word take form
and drop, seemingly without justification for its very existence.
My students had spent their entire tenure at Castlemont in similar
conditions.
Talking to my students about the law in this context, I was
faced with the contrast of my own unexamined idealism about
the transformative-and normative-power of the law. I also
had the disheartening sense that I was not offering the students
information or skills with practical or otherwise meaningful value.
More often I felt that I was contributing to a sense of alienation
and a kind of dislocation that reminded me of my own law school
experience. This problem felt particularly strong when dealing with
issues of anti-discrimination law and policy, for example in the
housing law section. Anti-discrimination law seemed particularly
relevant to my students, yet at the same time absurd in relation to
what I grasped about the reality of their lives. Moreover, the way
I understood the task of teaching them the law left little room
for us to bring that reality to the fore and engage it with the legal
text. If the project was to bring these youth knowledge of the law,
how could I do it in an empowering, meaningful, or at least non-
damaging way? And how much of this challenge lay in the nature
of the beast I brought with me: the inedible legal text?
In this essay, I argue that the failure of anti-discrimination law
to address the problems of subordination reflects the hegemonic
perspective in legal narratives. For the lawyer concerned with
Vol. 9:2
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social change, it is imperative to identify these narratives and the
ways in which they not only inhibit deep social change, but may
perpetuate the conditions of subordination. Yet, law school polices
against the consciousness necessary for the lawyer to identify the
hegemonic narrative in the law, and often instills attitudes which
are antithetical to the project of social change. In this context,
Street Law is an arena for the development of counter-hegemonic
consciousness in the lawyer and in subordinated communities.
Literature on narrative from the legal and social science
communities inform this analysis. Activist legal academics and
practitioners have increasingly turned to narrative as a method
for invigorating theory, practice, and the relationship between
the two. From the insight that law and legal storytelling is
neither fixed nor objective, these scholars have argued for the
transformative potential of incorporating traditionally excluded
voices and viewpoints into legal discourse; they have utilized
out-group 3 stories to reexamine strategies in community law
practice,4 focus critiques of specific laws and policies,5 and have
promulgated narrative itself as an alternative form of academic
3. For the purposes of this paper, I use Richard Delgado's definition of out-
group: "any group whose consciousness is other than that of the dominant
one." Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 n.8 (1988) (here-
inafter Plea).
4. See Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice
and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861
(1992) (hereinafter Poverty Law Narratives); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107
(1991).
5. See Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers' Ethics: A Report on
Seven Interviews, 64 FoRDHAM L. Ray. 1763 (1996); Margaret M. Russell,
Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive
Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992).
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expression.6 Explicit or implicit in this work is an understanding
that the transformative potential in storytelling exists for both
speaker and listener (roles which, of course, may be dynamic).
Thus, inseparable from any further instrumental goals, the
speaker may find healing in articulating an experience which had
formerly been excluded or denied; the listener may enrich their
understanding of the world by sharing in that experience.7
On a complimentary and often overlapping path, social sci-
entists examining the relationship between law and society have
also focused increasing attention on narrative. Generally speaking,
these scholars conceptualize narrative as a social phenomenon
whereby understandings of power and identity are both shared
and constructed. 8 In addition to studying how narratives are pro-
duced and function as social action, social scientists have used
narrative as a source of data regarding, for example, perspectives on
and utilization of existing legal resources and remedies.9 In either
context, these scholars' focus on the social dynamics of legality
in daily life (inside and outside specifically legal institutional
settings) broadens understanding of the significance of adding
new perspectives to the project of legal criticism.
6. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY
OF A LAw PROFESSOR (1991); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE
NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
7. Plea, supra note 3, at 2439.
8. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Taes:
Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 197 (1995) (hereinafter
Subversive).
9. See PATRICIA EWICK AND SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (hereinafter, COMMON PLACE); David
M. Engel and Frank W Munger, Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of
Difference, 30 LAw AND Soc'Y REV. 7 (1996); Austin Sarat, "... The Law isAll
Over"' Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, "2 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
Vol. 9:2
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As will be seen in Part II of this essay, I conceptualize the
classroom as a narrative moment in which legal text, interpretation
and experience come together, and then establish a framework
for analyzing these elements. First, I describe the Castlemont
community as illustrating conditions of social marginalization and
subordination. Next, I define the concept of narrative in greater
detail, and introduce Ewick and Silbey's theory of hegemonic
and counter-hegemonic narrative. Lastly, this Part analyzes the
narrative of discrimination offered by anti-discrimination law as
hegemonic.
Part III explores how legal education thwarts development
of the consciousness and skills a lawyer needs to work for social
change. First, I discuss the conditions associated with counter-
hegemonic consciousness. Next, I argue that the objective
viewpoint of the law is hegemonic in nature. The manifestation of
this viewpoint in law school hinders the development of counter-
hegemonic consciousness in persons of the law, instills attitudes
which thwart the project of social change, and leads to widespread
alienation-particularly among students with viewpoints that are
marginalized within law school.
Finally, Part IV returns to the Street Law classroom, and
the nature of the opportunity Street Law presents for a person
of the law and her students. This Part suggests that Street Law is
an opportunity to develop the consciousness and other qualities
necessary for social justice lawyering. This part also suggests that
subjectivityis an appropriate methodologyto employ in developing
a pedagogy that encourages counter-hegemonic consciousness in
the Street Law classroom.
2008
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IL Context and Framework: Teaching as a Narrative
Moment
A classroom provides a space and a structure for stories. The
confluence of text and the experiences and perspectives of students
and teacher influence what stories will be told and what will be
heard. In this view, none of these classroom ingredients are passive,
including the subject to be studied. Further, all have the potential
to be transformed within the dynamics of the encounter. While
this perspective suggests that students, text, or teachers are not
wholly determinative of any particular outcome, it also suggests
the importance of each to the other and to the project of teaching
itself. This Part seeks to contextualize my discussion of teaching
Street Law by describing the Castlemont neighborhood and
student community in greater detail, introducing the framework
of narrative, and then discussing a legal subject highly relevant to
this community-anti-discrimination law.
a. The Castlemont School Community
Conditions at Castlemont and the neighborhood it is a
part of are interlocking conditions of social marginalization
and subordination: poverty, violence, and the social isolation of
racial and ethnic minorities.'0 As members of this community,
10. This is not to say that these are the only conditions of subordination or
social marginalization, but that they are such conditions. Moreover, although
the intervening years have resulted in dramatic changes in Castlemont's struc-
ture (it now consists of three smaller schools on one campus), data in the Ex-
ecutive Summary School Accountability Report Card 2005-6 for each school
indicates that conditions of poverty and social isolation of minorities persists.
Leadership Preparatory School, http://webportal.ousd.kl2.ca.us/sarc/docs/
sarc05-06/html/leadershipSARC.htm (last visited March 30, 2008); Busi-
ness and Information Technology School, http://webportal.ousd.k12.ca.us/
sarc/docs/sarc05-06/html/CBITS%2OSarc.htm (last visited March 30, 2008);
Vol. 9:2
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Castlemont students are among the socially disadvantaged,
however defined.
Castlemont sprawls for most of a city block in the Elmhurst
District, one of Oakland's poorest and most violence-plagued
communities, 11 sharing an eastern stretch of MacArthur Boule-
vard with neighborhood churches, liquor stores, mostly empty
storefronts, and blocks of vacant, fenced lots.
The year I taught Street Law, approximately 1,576 students,
grades nine through twelve, were enrolled at Castlemont.12
Reflecting the racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhood,
African Americans comprised 67.1% of the student body (or
1,057 students), Latinos 26.1% (412), Asian Americans 4.6%
(72), Pacific Islanders 1.6% (25), Caucasians 0.4% (6), and
Native Americans 0.1% (1). Additionally, 24.6% of Castlemont's
students were designated limited English proficiency; only 1% of
East Oakland School of the Arts, http://webportal.ousd.kl2.ca.us/sarc/docs/
sarc05-O6/html/EOSA%20SARC%2005-06.htm (last visited March 30,
2008) (hereinafter OUSD Executive Summary). For general information
about Castlemont Community of Small Schools, see Castlemont Community
of Small Schools, http://tlc.ousd.kl2.ca.us/castlemont/about/ccss.php (last
visited March 30, 2008).
11. The Elmhurst district, where Castlemont is located, had one of the high-
est murder rates in the state in 1999. Jim Huron Zamora, Mayor to Restructure
Oakland Police Force, S.F EXAMINER, March 26, 1999, at A16.
12. Statistics regarding the Castlemont student body are drawn from the
1998 Annual Report to the Community on Oakland Public Schools, published
by the Oakland Coalition of Congregations in collaboration with the Oakland
Unified School District and the Oakland Education Association, and from the
Comprehensive High School Profile for Castlemont. Both reports were previ-
ously available from the Pubic Information Department of the Oakland Uni-
fied School District. However, when I recently sought to obtain copies in order
to prepare this article for publication, I was informed by the Office of the State
Trustee for the school district that all copies of the records have been destroyed.
Nor was I able to obtain the records from the Oakland Education Association
or Coalition of Congregations.
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these students were re-designated English proficient in 1997-1998.
Ninety-one percent of the students lived in households where
AFDC is a source of financial support.13
The average GPA for all course work at Castlemont was 1.49.
Only 17% of students were taking course work designated college
preparatory; of those, the average GPA was 1.32. Among eleventh
graders taking the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), 90% scored
below the 5 0 h percentile in reading, 79% scored below the 50 t
percentile in language, and 87% were below the 5 0 th percentile in
math. Castlemont's composite score for the SAT (713, including
grades nine through eleven in all test subjects) was 147 points
lower than the Oakland Unified School District's composite score,
and lower than any other school in the district; it was 300 points
lower than the state composite score. 14
The Comprehensive High School Profile provided by the
Oakland school board does not offer statistics on the number
of classes which failed to provide text books and other necessary
supplies to students, the number of days the library was closed,
or the number of class days missed due to teacher absences and a
lack of substitutes due to substandard qualifications or because of
fear for personal safety, although I observed these problems were
endemic at the school.
13. The students in my class more or less reflected this profile. Of my thirty-
two students, eight were Latino, one was Pacific Islander, and twenty-three
were African American. Ability to read and write in English was poor for most
of my students. It was difficult to assess abilities with complete accuracy how-
ever. For example, I discovered that some students masked levels of illiteracy
with strategies such as refusing to hand in written assignments, copying work,
and plagiarism from other materials. I was not privileged to information about
their status vis-a-vis AFDC.
14. Available data for the 2005-2006 school year shows that a troubled aca-
demic environment continues at the campus. OUSD Executive Summary, su-
pra note 10.
Vol. 9:2
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However, the issue of violence at Castlemont is well-
documented elsewhere. In 1998, from September 8 (the first
day of school) to October 15, at least ten students were seriously
injured in fights at the school.15 'The violence climaxed with the
stabbing of a Castlemont student by a former student who had
made an unauthorized visit onto school grounds. 6 The following
day, approximately one quarter of the student body stayed away
from school, many in fear for their safety.'7 In the midst of the
barrage of media attention, school administrators finally stepped
up security at the campus. However, their belated attempts,
including locking down the campus after 8:30 a.m. and keeping
all students on the grounds at lunchtime, 8 added to a pressure-
cooker environment in which inter-student hostilities flared
easily.' 9
Some blamed the outbreak of violence on the area's changing
demographics-increasing numbers of new immigrants were
moving into a once more solidlyAfricanAmerican neighborhood-
combined with race-based gang membership. ° My students said
it was neither, and blamed it on "stupidity." According to them,
and their primary teacher, this bout of violence was part of a
predictable cycle-escalating every fall, cooling off for the winter,
15. Lori Olszewski, A Time for Healing, S.E CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 1998,
at A21. According to my students, and my observations while at the school,
many more students were injured than officially reported-some of whom had




19. As did student-teacher conflicts. See Lori Olszewski, Oakland Teacher
Slapped, S.F CHRONICLE, Oct. 21, 1998, at Al5.
20. Two gangs claimed turf which includes Castlemont, an African Ameri-
can street gang called the Rolling 100s, and a Mexican American gang called
the Border Brothers. Olszewski, supra note 15.
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and starting back up again in the spring. In this perspective, once
a few people acted "stupid," it was easy for anything to function
as an excuse for more violence.
Whatever the trigger in any given instance, violence was
indeed a part of the fabric of life for Castlemont students, and
it spilled over into my classroom in various forms. When a fight
erupted between two boys in my Street Law class, another teacher
and I were helpless to stop them; one of the boys ended up with a
dislocated shoulder, another incident absent from the official list.
Violence also left its mark on the classroom in the form of the
cloud of depression that settled on everyone after a particularly
bad incident on campus, or the edgy sadness of individual students
who had experienced, or expected, trouble. Violence at home,
or between couples, entered the classroom as well. The students'
primary teacher and I met several times about reporting suspected
abuse whenever students showed up in class with unexplained
injuries, such as black eyes.
But this overview of the Castlemont community is perhaps
partially misleading. It is important to note that my students were
survivors. First of all, they were alive-which can be considered an
achievement in the neighborhood.' Moreover, primarily seniors
(there was one junior in the class), they hoped to graduate and an
21. While the danger of not surviving to adulthood is elevated in a neighbor-
hood like Elmhurst, it is important to note that teens are generally more likely
to be targets of crime than adults. Indeed, they are more than twice as likely
to become victims of violent crime as any other group. Joanne C. Lin et al.,
Youth Violence: Redefining the Problem, Rethinking the Solutions, 28 CLEARING-
HOUSE REv. 357, 357-58 (1994). Further, African Americans and Hispanics
are the most frequent victims of crime, with African Americans being violent
crime victims more than any other racial group. Robert Blakey, Federal Crimi-
nal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional Theory or New Congressional
Statutes But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1175, 1189 n.30 (1995).
Vol. 9:2
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informal survey showed that many, despite their poor preparation,
hoped to go to college. Further, many were struggling to come to
class in spite of competing responsibilities. Most of my students
worked part-time jobs, and several were responsible for helping to
support their families. Many also had significant responsibilities
for children at home, with several students needing to take
lengthy absences in order to take care of siblings or the children
of siblings.22
As Gerald L6pez points out, "when we call a person or a
group 'subordinated' . . we're always describing a state of relative
powerlessness. For all that they endure [the subordinated] still
retain the capacity ... to resist victimization and subordination
and to reverse its tendencies. ' 23 This is an important insight
in terms of recognizing the myopic tendencies of any total
classification. However, as an emphasis on these students' tenacity
shows, their resistance necessarily references the adversity which
is the context of its emergence, and which might pull them under
at any time. Put another way, conditions of subordination shape
the challenges the students face and can only partially control.
Watching my students struggle through the surreal chaos, which
often characterized life at Castlemont, I sometimes visualized a
person stepping out of bed each morning onto a loose floorboard
that flew up and struck him or her in the face. It was difficult to
see what was responsible for the injury: the broken board or the
act of stepping, much less how to avoid being struck again when,
if that board were avoided or repaired, others lay in wait.
22. Most students at Castlemont who had children of their own were in a
separate program designed for teen parents, which provides on-site childcare.
23. GERALD P. L6PEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIvE LAw PRACTICE 41 (1992).
2008
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If the story of Castlemont and its student community is
then-definitively, if not solely- one of social marginalization
and subordination, what is its significance for the Street Law
classroom? The next section will lay groundwork for using the
concept of narrative to consider that question in the context of
anti-discrimination law.
b. Framework: Narrative
The terms "narrative" and "story" are often used inter-change-
ably - including in this essay. It is useful however, in defining
what is meant by narrative, to untangle them for a moment.
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey identify three features a
communication must have in order to qualify as narrative: selec-
tive appropriation of past events and characters; presentation of
events in a temporal order with beginning, middle and end; and
a relating of the events and characters to one another and to a
statement about why and how the events occurred.24 Hayden
White calls this latter feature the "closure," or the "demand...
for moral meaning."25 This definition might also describe stories
or tales, and indeed narratives are vehicles for stories. However,
because the overarching framework of moral meaning can vary,
several narratives can exist to explain the same thing. As Richard
Delgado observes,
[a] rectangular red object on my living room floor
may be a nuisance if I stub my toe on it in the dark, a
doorstop if I use it for that purpose, further evidence
of my lackadaisical housekeeping to my visiting
24. Subversive, supra note 8, at 200.
25. Id. at 200-01 (citing HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FoRi:
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 21 (1987)).
Vol. 9:2
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mother, a toy to my young daughter, or simply a
brick left over from my patio restoration project.26
These possible stories about the object would be communi-
cated through narratives, each also revealing something about the
teller's perspective, experience, and identity.27
Delgado's illustration highlights the fact that narrative is not
a rarified event but something occurring all the time, in all facets
of human life and interaction. Yet, the peculiar characteristics of
narrative often render its operation in discourse invisible. Unlike
assertions of empirical fact, narratives make claims about causality
and truth that are often implicit, and thus "elude challenges,
testing, or debate. '28 For example,
[w]hereas a general claim that a certain group is
inferior or dangerous might be contested on empirical
grounds, an individual story about being mugged,
a story which includes an incidental reference to
the nonwhite race of the assailant, communicates
a similar message but under the protected guise of
simply stating the "facts."29
Similarly, as explanations for "the way things are," narratives
frequently obscure their relationship to the social structures within
which they are produced (i.e., racism) and from which they derive
their plausibility (i.e., the assumption that crime is perpetrated
primarily by non-whites). Ewick and Silbey call this tendency
within narrative hegemonic, insofar as it constitutes and re-creates
26. Plea, supra note 3, at 2416.
27. See Poverty Law Narratives, supra note 4, at 866 n.1 4 .
28. Subversive, supra note 8, at 214.
29. Id.
2008
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a taken-for-granted perspective on the world or particular people
and events within it.3 0
Obviously, however, people do not always agree with assump-
tions they recognize embedded in the narratives of others. Also,
some stories expose specific relations to social structures. Ewick and
Silbey call narratives which achieve the latter counter-hegemonic
or subversive. An example comes from an encounter I had while
getting fingerprinted at the police station for the Determination
of Moral Character portion of the California State Bar. The
cadet fingerprinting me asked why I needed the prints, and my
explanation segued into a gripe session about my disgust with the
Moral Character application. I was angry about the intrusion into
my personal life. In addition, I pointed out, requirements like
listing every place you have lived since age eighteen, or worked
more than six months, were clearly geared toward students right
out of college, and burdensome for a woman in her late thirties.
"As if this succeeds at keeping bad actors out of the profession!,"
I complained. The cadet, a woman, nodded. "We had some of
the same hoops to jump through here at the police station," she
commiserated, adding, "it's all about old boys' networks. They set
it up and that's who benefits. They make it hard for you."
The cadet's response explicitly rejected the official explanation
for the "hoops" I had alluded to (safeguarding the profession) and
offered a counter-explanation that expanded on my suggestion
that the rules regarding admission were not made with women
like me in mind. By connecting our experiences with the familiar
narrative of male protection of privilege, she telegraphed a theory
that changed my story of frustration into a larger story about
exclusion. Moreover, because I had complained about issues
30. Id. at 212.
Vol. 9:2
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related to age, not specifically gender, and because she was African
American and I am white, I understood her to be choosing a
theme that reflected our commonality-and the origins of both
our professions-without necessarily sacrificing the different ways
the harms of exclusion might manifest. Her story was counter-
hegemonic because it directly referenced social structures related
to differential access to power or, in other words, located "the
individual within social organization."
c. Anti-Discrimination Law as Hegemonic Narrative
As a social institution, law is like the classroom in that it
creates a space and a structure for narratives; it also constitutes
narrative insofar as it tells a story about the way things
are. Anti-discrimination law references a complex body of
doctrine interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.
Nonetheless, some general principles can be ascertained. The
analytical framework of narrative reveals anti-discrimination
law as embodying hegemonic narratives regarding the problem
of racial discrimination and, therefore, its solution. Informed
by these narratives, the doctrine of anti-discrimination law
cannot recognize, describe, or address the interrelated nature of
subordination faced by inner city youth such as Castlemont's
students. Thus, not only may it lack utility for solving problems
related to discrimination, it does not provide a useful framework
for analyzing the circumstances of subordination. Indeed, it
may serve to perpetuate the conditions of subordination by
simultaneously obscuring and reinforcing the social structures of
their creation.
Anti-discrimination law tells a story about racial discrimina-
tion that proceeds from what Alan Freeman describes as the
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"perpetrator perspective," as contrasted to the "victim perspec-
tive."'" These perspectives create very different vantage points
from which to analyze social inequality:
From the victim's perspective, racial discrimination
describes those conditions of actual social existence
as a member of a perpetual underclass. This perspec-
tive includes both the objective conditions of life
(lack of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing) and
the consciousness associated with those objective
conditions (lack of choice and lack of human indi-
viduality in being forever perceived as a member of a
group rather than as an individual). The perpetrator
perspective sees racial discrimination not as condi-
tions but as actions, or a series of actions, inflicted
on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is more
on what particular perpetrators have done to some
victims than on the overall life situation of the vic-
tim class. 32
From the perpetrator perspective, discrimination is an
aberrant act occurring between "atomistic individuals" whose ac-
tions are understandable without reference to social structures
or history.33 Corresponding to the belief that discrimination is
aberrant, the perpetrator perspective presupposes a society that
is otherwise basically fair.34 The role of anti-discrimination law in
31. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-
Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29 (Kim-
berI6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (hereinafter Legitimizing).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 30.
34. The perpetrator perspective corresponds with other dominant narratives
regarding, for example, the history of racism. Delgado gives an accessible ac-
count of the dominant discrimination narrative as it relates to race discrimina-
tion against African Americans:
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this view is to restore normalcy-in other words, to preserve the
conditions within which the discriminatory act arose.
As Freeman explains, the perpetrator perspective spawns
twin doctrinal concepts in anti-discrimination law: fault and
causation. 3' The concepts of fault and causation operate, in
interrelated ways, the assumption that blame-worthiness and its
effects are limited and can be identified with some certainty, and
serve to maintain the status quo of racial inequality. Below I discuss
some of the problems that spin off from these dual concepts and
the assumptions which inform them.
Early in our history there was slavery, which was a terrible
thing. Blacks were brought to this country from Africa in
chains and made to work in the fields. Some were viciously
mistreated, which was, of course, an unforgivable wrong; oth-
ers were treated kindly. Slavery ended with the Civil War, al-
though many blacks remained poor, uneducated, and outside
the cultural mainstream. As the country's racial sensitivity to
blacks' plight increased, the vestiges of slavery were gradually
eliminated by federal statutes and case law. Today, blacks have
many civil rights and are protected from discrimination in such
areas as housing, public education, employment, and voting.
The gap between blacks and whites is steadily closing, although
it may take some time to close completely. At the same time, it
is important not to go too far in providing special benefits for
blacks. Doing so induces dependency and wellfare mentality.
It can also cause a backlash among innocent white victims of
reverse discrimination. Most Americans are fair-minded indi-
viduals who harbor little racial prejudice. The few who do can
be punished when they act on those beliefs.
Plea, supra note 3, at 2417.
Notice that this narrative supports the perpetrator perspective by isolating his-
torical events-not just by placing slavery-cum-discrimination in the distant
past, but by isolating the history of the subordination of blacks from the sys-
temic subordination of other minority groups.
35. Legitimizing, supra note 31, at 30.
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i. Fault and the Problem of Intent
First, the concept of fault dictates that discrimination
must have been enacted by an identifiable, blameworthy person
or small group of persons.3 6 Moreover, only intentional fault is
characterized as illegal discrimination in most cases. In state action
cases, this means that plaintiffs challenging a racially neutral law
must satisfy the doctrine of discriminatory purpose. This doctrine
requires direct or circumstantial proof that a racially discriminatory
purpose motivated those responsible for the laws enactment or
administration.37 In most cases, when alleging discrimination by
private (non-state) actors, intentional discrimination must also be
proven.
38
Plaintiffs can attempt to prove discriminatory intent through
direct evidence (i.e., statements regarding intent), circumstantial
evidence (i.e., comparative treatment of members of other groups),
and/or statistical evidence. The burden of proof on the plaintiff
is high. While the defendant can introduce a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for the challenged employment action,
36. Id.
37. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding no prima fa-
cie showing of discrimination where a screening test for District of Columbia
police officers resulted in a failure rate that was four times higher for blacks
than for whites absent proof of intent to discriminate; no showing of rational
purpose for the test was required).
38. Disparate impact cases, limited to Title VII cases by the Supreme Court
in Washington v. Davis, are an exception to this general rule. Disparate im-
pact theory allows plaintiffs to challenge facially neutral employment selection
criterion-such as educational requirements, tests, and measuring devises-
which have a demonstrably unequal impact on a particular group, without
proving the practice was intentionally discriminatory. However, the employer
can defend against a showing of disparate impact by proving the challenged
practice was a business necessity. 'The Court's scrutiny of business necessity
appears to be declining. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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disproving this reason does not prove the employment action
was motivated by racial animus. 31 Thus, the plaintiff not only has
to prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent in
a positive sense, he or she may have to disprove other asserted
motives such as "personal animosity."4 °
Intent requirements distort the project of remedying
discrimination on several levels. First, plaintiffs are asked to prove
something that probably does not exist, at least as conceptualized
by the law. Modern psychological theories teach that people
often do not discriminate intentionally, or at least consciously.
Cognitive theories of psychological development, for example,
suggest that discrimination can result from the learning of racial
(and other) stereotypes that are culturally transmitted, and which
inform interpretations of people and events in processes that are
unrecognized by the conscious mind.4 In addition, Freudian
theory suggests that the strength of social norms which are broadly
accepted and contradictory to racism, such as the norm of equal
opportunity, heightens the likelihood that conscious knowledge
of racist ideas and feelings will be suppressed in order to relieve
the mind of guilt.42
39. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
40. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 2 F.3d 264, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1993) (re-
manding to the district court with instructions to reconsider the case in light of
the Supreme Court's decision on this issue). The plaintiff may be able to prove
mixed-motives existed, but one of the motives must have been to intentionally
discriminate on a forbidden basis. Id.; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989).
41. See Word, supra note 1, at 337-38; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995) (discussing disparate
treatment jurisprudence).
42. Word, supra note 1, at 337-38.
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These theories point to the cruel irony that anti-discrimi-
nation law requires plaintiffs to prove intentionality while simul-
taneously perpetuating ideology, which lessens the likelihood that
intentional racism will be recognizable to minority or majority
group members. The perpetrator's underlying assumption that
society is not discriminatory absent the actions of blameworthy
individuals encourages the perception that equality of oppor-
tunity actually exists. Moreover, it reinforces attitudes of non-
accountability for racism and inequality among majority group
members, while flipping the blame for conditions of subor-
dination onto the subordinated. These effects interact to make
it more difficult for victims of discrimination to recognize discri-
mination or to "name their experience." At the same time, the
notion of individual, intentional blame for discrimination
inhibits development of collective feelings of responsibility for the
problem and its solution.43
Moreover, the intent requirement ignores the fact "that
the injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of the decision-
makers' motives."" As Lawrence queries,
[d]oes the black child in a segregated school expe-
rience less stigma and humiliation because the local
school board did not consciously set out to harm
her? Are blacks less prisoners of the ghetto because
the decision that excludes them from an all-white
neighborhood was made with property values and
not race in mind?4 5
43. Id. at 239.
44. Id. at 236.
45. Id
Vol. 9:2 "
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ii. Causation and the Problem of Harm
In many situations however, intent is irrelevant because a
victim, jurisprudentially speaking, does not exist. Put another
way, certain actions, although based at least in part on racial
bias, are not illegal discrimination. The concept of causation
requires a plaintiff to isolate a particular condition and closely
link it with behavior by the defendant. However, without a legal
theory recognizing the linkage, there is no basis for a claim. For
example, a company's decision to relocate from an urban area to
the suburbs may or may not be motivated by the desire for a white
workforce. However, the reduced employment opportunities for
a minority workforce left behind do not generate a cause of action
against this employer. The only theory under Title VII that allows
impact alone to prove discrimination applies to selection criteria.
Other theories would require an adverse employment action
taken in regard to specific employees. Reduced life chances are
not interpreted as employment actions.
In state action cases, these issues play out in standing analysis.
Standing doctrine is judge-made law extrapolated from Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which limits the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to actual "cases" and "controversies." This
provision is considered to forbid courts to rule on executive or
legislative action outside of a constitutional case, regardless of the
constitutionality of the government action. To have standing to
bring a claim, a plaintiff's complaint must, among other things,
"fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked."46
In addition, the "plaintiff must allege a personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
46. Allen v: Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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likely to be redressed by the requested relief."47 The injury must
be "'distinct and palpable,' and not 'abstract' or 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."48 If the "line of causation" between injury and
conduct is too attenuated, the plaintiff does not have standing to
bring her claim-or, put another way, the court lacks jurisdiction
to hear it.
49
Standing doctrine has been held to preclude cases alleging
injuries based on racial stigma-collective harm experienced
by members of a minority group as a result of government
participation in the social structuring of racial discrimination-
unless it is personally experienced, meaning "personally denied
equal treatment" under the challenged action.5" Even where
an injury is personally experienced, however, the connection
between the challenged action and the hoped-for remedy might be
insufficiently clear to provide standing. Ironically, the challenged
action itself may create the problem of knowing what the situation
would be absent the action.
In Allen v. Wright, the plaintiffs (respondents in the Supreme
Court) were held to lack standing on both of these grounds.5
Allen was a nationwide class action brought by parents of African
American school children against the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), alleging that the IRS failed to carry out its obligation to
deny tax-exempt status to private schools on the basis of race.52
47. Id.
48. Id. at 751 (internal citations omitted).
49. Id. at 752. Of course, this standing requirement, which serves to prevent
a claim in a given instance, is a shell game: if the law invoked was interpreted as
intending to reach a given injury, such injury would not be attenuated.
50. Id. at 755.
51. Id. I will refer to the respondents as "plaintiffs" for clarity.
52. Allen, 468 U.S. at 739-40 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574
(1983)), where the Court held that the governing statute disqualified schools
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The plaintiffs argued that this failure amounted to federal support
of segregated schools and fostered the organization and expansion
of such schools; thus, interfering in the efforts of federal agencies
and courts in desegregating public school districts.53 They
claimed two injuries: direct harm by the fact the government was
supporting segregated schools, and harm because the government's
actions impaired their ability to successfully desegregate their
public schools.54 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
characterized the first injury as a claim of stigmatic injury
unsuitable to provide standing. The second claim was rejected as
based on a too attenuated connection between the IRS's conduct
and the desegregation of the plaintiffs' schools.55
Exemplifying the perpetrator perspective, O'Connor wrote:
"From the perspective of the IRS, the injury to respondents is
highly indirect and 'results from the independent action of some
third party not before the court.' 5 6 She stated that the plaintiffs'
injury might be "fairly traceable" to the IRS if "enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions" were
located in plaintiffs' neighborhoods to suggest that withdrawal
of those exemptions would make "an appreciable difference in
public school integration.."5 7 However, even this vague basis
for cognizable injury is illusory, because the result of ending
government support for discrimination is uncertain:
[I]t is entirely speculative.., whether withdrawal of
a tax exemption from any particular school would
that discriminated on the basis of race from tax-exempt status as charities.
53. Id. at 743-744.
54. Id. at 745.
55. Id. at 754-57.
56. Id. at 758.
57. Id.
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lead the school to change its policies . . . . [i]t is
just as speculative whether any given parent of a
child attending such a private school would decide
to transfer the child to public school as a result of
any changes in educational . .. policy made by the
private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-
exempt status. It is also pure speculation whether, in
a particular community, a large enough number of
the numerous relevant school officials and parents
would reach decisions that collectively would have a
significant impact on the racial composition of the
public schools. 8
The logic of the perpetrator perspective manifest in Allen
severely limits the ability to challenge government actions that
support subordination of minority groups, even when the
government action violates other (non-constitutional) mandates
(i.e., the statutory scheme applicable to IRS exemptions). Yet, it
is the Court's mystification of the linkages between IRS inaction
and historical and social context that makes the remedy uncertain.
The Court's characterization of cause and effect as random and
indeterminate obscures the fact that whites in general chose to
separate themselves from blacks, a phenomenon documented
in the residential housing context.59 From this perspective, any
government support for segregation facilitates the tendency for
what we have come to call white flight. Similarly, withdrawal of
governmental support would likely be insufficient to stop self-
segregation entirely, but might discourage it. Of course, even with
a contextualized analysis, the perpetrator perspective suggests that
liability should not be imposed because the blame is so shared and
diffused.
58. Id. at 757.
59. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
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The traditional causation requirement breaks down when
responsibility for subordination in society is revealed as complex
and social in addition to a personal problem. Indeed, many
situations that illustrate subordination reveal no blameworthy
perpetrator. Like the image of loose boards striking the unwary
I used to describe the lives of my students at Castlemont, cause
and effect seem impossible to discern from the perpetrator
perspective. This is not only because the perpetrator perspective
lacks context to interpret the metaphor; it is also because it never
questions the existence of the metaphorical boards themselves. Like
the administrators (and reporters) who struggled to make sense
of and respond to the outbreak of violence at Castlemont, anti-
discrimination law holds constant everything but the problem,
narrowly defined, at hand. Thus, at Castlemont the question
became: Is the cause of the violence gangs? Growing diversity
in the ghetto? Youthful foolishness with a dangerous inner city
twist? Missing are questions regarding the existence of these very
features, along with how it came to pass that thousands of primarily
minority students are warehoused in schools without basic
educational resources, and what relationship this development
might have with the perpetuation of violence and poverty in their
communities.
Similarly, the law of discrimination, as constituted, cannot
address the wheels of society and the way they turn and create the
situations faced by Castlemont students or other subordinated
peoples. Lacking an analysis of the epiphenomenons of
subordination, which locates individuals in social structures, the
perpetrator perspective disallows any meaningful discourse for
moving beyond these problems, in imagination or in fact.
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IIL Counter-Hegemonic Consciousness, Legal
Viewpoint, and Forming "Persons of the Law"
The conditions of subordination and the limits of anti-
discrimination law in addressing those conditions illustrate a
paradox for the lawyer concerned with social change: the lawyer's
tools constrain the very task for which they are employed and
conditions hoped to be addressed through law may instead
be perpetuated. Because of this paradox, it is essential for the
lawyer to understand not only the law, but its limits; to develop
the imagination the law lacks. In other words, the lawyer needs
counter-hegemonic consciousness. This implies other, related
qualities which are necessary as well. The lawyer needs humility
regarding her role and the utility of law; creativity to imagine
how both law and society might be different, and how the tools
of lawyering might be strategically employed;60 and openness to
the data which fuel critique-her own experience and that of her
clients and others. These qualities, in turn, generate and sustain
the counter-hegemonic understanding lawyering for social change
requires. What, then, might contribute to the development and/
or support of this consciousness?
a. Conditions of counter-hegemonic consciousness
Ewick and Silbey posit three conditions related to counter-
hegemonic consciousness and the production of subversive
60. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Trans-
formation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THE-
ORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 119 (Kimberl6 Cren-
shaw et al. eds., 1995), on the paradox of using flawed tools in the struggle
for African American rights. ("... the task at hand is to devise ways to wage
ideological and political struggle while minimizing the costs of engaging in an
inherently legitimating discourse.").
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narratives: social marginality, recognition of the world as socially
constructed, and opportunity for storytelling.61
According to Ewick and Silbey, the condition of social
marginality may contribute to counter-hegemonic consciousness
because "[b]y definition, it is the marginal .. .whose lives and
experiences are least likely to find expression in the culturally
dominant schemas and who have [the] most restricted access to
resources." 62 Put another way, "those who are most subject to
power are most likely to be acutely aware of its operation. 63
However, as the authors recognize, social marginalization
alone is not sufficient to challenge hegemony. The products of
inequalities in social power may not be perceived as unfair, and those
subject to power may not recognize opportunities for resistance
and change. 6' Thus, another condition for counter-hegemonic
consciousness is "understanding how the hegemonic is constituted
as an ongoing concern." 65 One example of this understanding is
the realization that law consists of socially constructed narratives
related to a particular take on what constitutes reality. The import
of the understanding is instrumental:
Perceiving a concealed agenda and knowing the
rules enhance the possibilities of intervention and
resistance .... [R]esistance [is] opportunistic, taking
advantage of openings within the face of power to
escape, if only momentarily, its effects. For this to
61. COMMON PLACE, supra note 9, at 234-44; Subversive, supra note 8, at
220-22.
62. COMMON PLACE, supra note 9, at 234-35.
63. Id. at 235.
64. Id. at 238-39.
65. Id. at 239.
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occur, one must recognize opportunity when it
comes along.66
Resistance may be comprised of any number of acts,
including the reordering of experience within an interpretation
which counters hegemonic meanings regarding experience.
Lawyers do this when they push at the boundaries of the law,
using the "nonfit" of their client's experience 67- albeit partially,
as they work within the constraints of legal frameworks. Catherine
MacKinnon described this process as applied in the development
of sexual discrimination law:
The strictures of the concept of sex discrimination
will ultimately constrain those aspects of women's
oppression that will be legally recognized as discri-
minatory. At the same time, women's experiences,
expressed in their own way, can push to expand that
concept. Such an approach not only enriches the
law, it begins to shape it so that what really happens
to women, not to some male vision of what happens
to women, is at the core of the legal prohibition.68
Clients also resist legal frameworks when, for example, they
push at the boundaries of representation established by their
lawyers. The imposition of lawyer pre-understandings on clients
can result in misinterpretation of what clients want and need.69 In
some respects, revealing the law as a "game" with somewhat flex-
66. Id.
67. See Poverty Law Narratives, supra note 4, at 917.
68. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOM-
EN: A CAsE STUDY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 26 (1979).
69. Poverty Law Narratives, supra note 4, at 898-899.
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ible participatory rules can result in client rebellion against lawyer
control of strategy, and the assertion of their own values.70
As these examples suggest, however, information sharing is
essential to counter-hegemonic consciousness. Thus, the third
condition of counter-hegemonic consciousness is the presence
of opportunities to recognize and develop an awareness of the
relationship between the social construction of reality and self-
or, as Ewick and Silbey describe, the "connection between history
and biography."7 One way to do this is through storytelling.
Opportunities for subversive storytelling often arise from
the very conditions of subordination, as social structures "can
create both a common opportunity to narrate and a common
content to the narrative. The experience of sharing stories thus
has the potential to reveal the collective organization of power.
.."72 Ewick and Silbey give consciousness-raising groups of the
1960's as one example of a social structure (in that case, postwar
domesticity as a particular structure of female oppression) creating
opportunities for subversive storytelling.73 However, because
"storytelling is a conventional form ofsocial interaction," subversive
storytelling most often arises in the routines and circumstances
of every day life where people gather and talk, such as church,
school, work, and the supermarket.74 As my conversation with the
police cadet illustrates, even casual, serendipitous meetings can
uncover common experience within a confluence of constraints
70. See Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
71. COMMON PLACE, supra note 9, at 241.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE 83-90 (1989) (hereinafter STATE).
74. COMMON PLACE, supra note 9, at 242.
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and identities, bringing into question the status quo and creating
alternative explanations for that experience.
This characterization of storytelling as a condition for the
generation of counter-hegemonic consciousness invokes what
Delgado calls the "community-building functions" of sharing
stories.75 As he points out, however, counter-stories also serve
a destructive function. "They can show that what we believe is
ridiculous, self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out
of the trap of unjustified exclusion. They can help us understand
when it is time to reallocate power. They are the other half-the
destructive half-of the creative dialectic." 76 Thus, it is not just
the sharing of stories of commonality that may facilitate such
changes in consciousness, but the hearing of stories of difference.
As discussed above, for a person in the law concerned with using
the law for social reform, both functions are important. Ironically,
law school-a formative experience for a person of the law-
works against the generation or sustenance of counter-hegemonic
consciousness. Indeed, the law school experience tends to cut
students off from their pre-law school identities in ways that
subvert counter-hegemonic consciousness and the conditions
that sustain it, while new attitudes destructive to the project of
social reform are learned. This problem is related in part to the
hegemonic quality of legal narrative.
b. Law School: Destruction and Construction
As described earlier, anti-discrimination law embodies
hegemonic narrative in that it analyses discrimination in a way
that isolates incidents of discrimination from the social context
75. Plea, supra note 3, at 2414.
76. Id. at 2415.
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in which they occur. This is not the only quality of hegemony in
narrative however. As discussed in Part II (b) infra, hegemonic
narrative also obscures its own socially constructed nature as it
recreates a taken-for-granted perspective on the world. Thus, anti-
discrimination law presents itself not as one story, but as the story
of what constitutes discrimination, and moreover, not a story at
all. Anti-discrimination law shares with law generally the pretense
of objectivity, or point-of-view-lessness.
Catherine MacKinnon has referred to objectivity as the
"epistemology" of law, which it adopts in emulation of science.77
This has great significance for the lawyer, who must acquiesce in
some degree to the law's "way of knowing" in order to become a
person of the law. As MacKinnon writes:
Objectivity as a stance toward the world erects two tests to
which its method must conform: distance and aperspectivity. To
perceive reality accurately, one must be distant from what one is
looking at and view it from no place and at no time in particular,
hence from all places and times at once. This stance defines the
relevant world as that which can be objectivelyknown, as that which
can be known in this way. An epistemology decisively controls not
only the form of knowing but also its content by defining how to
proceed, the process of knowing, and by confining what is worth
knowing to that which can be known in this way.78
In law school, law students are trained in the epistemology
of the law through the case method. The latter requires the
abstraction of "relevant" facts from the messy tableau of life, in
order to compare those facts with other, like scenarios, in light
of a specific legal rule. Yet, within the guise of objectivity, these
77. MAcKINNONN, supra note 73, at 163.
78. Id. at 97.
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assumptions are both hidden in fact, and hidden as assumptions.
The subjective-personal experience, for example-is unwelcome
in the typical law school classroom. Moreover, objectivity-as-
epistemology creates the illusion that critique itself is subjective;
only contributions that reflect the law's dominant assumptions
are without viewpoint. In this way, law school polices against the
formation of counter-hegemonic consciousness. "Inquires flowing
from other visions are treated, by turns, as irrelevant, disruptive,
unintelligible, agitative," not just by professors, but by fellow
students.79
Obviously, some students continue to resist the hegemonic
force of the law school classroom. As suggested by Ewick and
Silbey's theory of counter-hegemonic consciousness, their
experience of non-fit can create common ground on which to
share and build new legal stories. Indeed, law students (and
professors) create spaces where hegemony can be challenged on
various levels, such as classes with "alternative" curriculum, and
journals and organizations which provide forums of expression
for the experience of ideological and/or cultural out-groups such
as feminists, gays and lesbians, and racial and ethnic minorities.
Products of this resistance include much of the literature cited in
this essay, and this essay itself. However, while resistance is not
futile, it may not be complete. The experience of law students
suggests that counter-hegemonic consciousness within hostile
institutions is at best ambivalent and partial.
At least one study suggests that, generally speaking, people are
changed by the law school experience in ways which make them
more uniformly conservative in outlook. In an in-depth, five year
79. LOPEZ, supra note 23 at 25.
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study of students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,8°
respondents across the board indicated "that law school taught
them to be 'less emotional,' 'more objective,' and to 'put away...
passions."''. Indeed, "[s]econd only to the skills of 'objectivity,'
students report[ed] that over time they ... learned to stop caring
about others and [became] more conservative. 82 Moreover, these
changes were greatest in students whose perspectives and goals
were initially in less conformity with the dominant law school
outlook: women of all races and ethnicities and, to a lesser extent,
men of color.
How this attitudinal transformation played out in women's
changing attitudes toward "the social status quo," and their
professional goals, provides a compelling illustration. First, the
study found that men and women in their first year of law school
had dramatically different assessments of sexism in their legal
education. Female first-year students, more than all other groups,
reported "that men are called on more often than women and
receive more time and more follow-up in class, that the gender
of students affects class experience, and that sexist comments are
permitted under the informal 'house rules' of the law school."83
The study also revealed a large discrepancy in the career goals of
male and female first-years: twenty-five to thirty-three percent
of first-year women, compared to seven percent of first-year
80. LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BOLIN, BECOMING GENTLE-
MEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997) (hereinafter
GENTLEMEN). This study did not have a statistically significant longitudinal
sample however. Id. at 133 n. 100 (discussing related issues, including typicality
of respondents).
81. Id. at 53.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 45.
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men, planned to find work in public interest law.84 However,
by the third year of law school these attitudinal differences had
diminished, with women's attitudes coming in line with their
male counterparts. By third year, only eight to ten percent of
women planned to practice in the public interest, compared to
five percent of men.85 Moreover, females in their third year of law
school no longer identified sexism as a serious problem.86
In regard to the latter, the authors write, "either women ...
tolerate displays of what they, as first year students, interpreted
as offensive incidents of sexism or, in fact, the frequency of such
incidents diminishes. '87 The study's written narrative and interview
data supports the former interpretation. As a third-year woman
(worrying that law school had changed her because she was now
more ambivalent about what constitutes sexism) explained, "I am
more willing to tolerate sexist comments or to assume they are
jokes rather than offenses." Narrative responses also identified a
profound sense of alienation among a disproportionate number of
all women (and men of color) from "their backgrounds, passions
and communities."8s
84. Id. at 45.
85. Career plans were compared by sex only, not race and sex. GENTLEMEN,
supra note 80, at 45. See table 4. However, narrative data from interviews and
written answers showed that some female students of color actually decided to
do public interest work as a result of their law school experience, because they
felt no one else would represent their communities. Id. at 51.
86. Id. at 46.
87. Id
88. Id. at 52. While those students who are less comfortable with the law
school status quo may suffer disproportionately (and the Penn study suggests
they do, see supra text accompanying note 117), law students in general experi-
ence a significant rise in psychological problems, and are nearly four times as
likely to suffer from depression and anxiety than the general population. BEN-
JAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW: UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS AND THE LAw
42 (Element Books 1994). One author connects this rise in mental anguish
Vol. 9:2
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While the authors focus on the alienating effect of classroom
pedagogy such as the Socratic Method, which includes the hostility
many female students perceive it generates in male classmates,89
to explain the results of their research, their data also points
to the legal viewpoint of objectivity which informs classroom
methodologies:9 °
Laced throughout the interviews with both white
women and, to a greater degree, women of color,
we hear the desire to reinsert culture, race, politics,
and 'emotions' back into legal interpretations. Many
students explain that the law is structured in ways
that value only individuals, not communities ....
These students want to be able to move from the
perspective of the elite to that of the victim, to pivot
their vantage and interpretations in ways that might
disrupt precedent, rather than merely accept the
'logic' of what has 'neutrally' been decided before. 1
among law students with the law's drive for objectivity, writing, "psychologi-
cal problems arise when one idea or perspective tyrannizes all others, thereby
restricting the soul's imaginative versatility." Id. at 43.
89. Seeid. at I IIn.2.
90. This is not to minimize the importance of the different ways hegemony
is maintained in law school-or other components of hegemony-but to fo-
cus on one aspect of the phenomenon. The University of Pennsylvania study
is remarkable in its documentation of the relationship between the mainte-
nance of patriarchy and law school pedagogy, and the ways in which different
aspects of pedagogy bolster one another and hegemony itself. The authors of
the study emphasize that the University of Pennsylvania is an Ivy League law
school, which may be an important factor in their results. Ivy League schools
have a distinctive history and culture. However, there is great uniformity in
law school teaching; utilization of the case method and Socratic Method is
nearly universal, especially in the first year. It would be interesting to research
the impact of alternative curriculum on law students, particularly when that
curriculum is introduced in the first year of law school.
91. GENTLEMEN, supra note 80, at 52.
2008
HeinOnline -- 9 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 321 2007-2008
RUTGERS RACE AND LAWREVIEW
However, as the study also shows, law school may not only
fail to give these students the opportunities and skills they seek,
they may leave law school having lost the desire or the emotional
strength to pursue thesp goals. Moreover, the new person of the
law is to some degree reconstructed in conformity with the law's
image. This can be crippling for the lawyer interested in social
reform. The collapse of the lawyer's world view into the law,
however partial, is the loss of her pre-law eyes and the loss of
empathy. "With blinders in place, 'I don't see your point' comes
to mean, 'I cannot look through your eyes."' 92
This relates to another aspect of the training of law students,
the formation of professional identity. In this regard, the law's
drive for objectivity and detachment from context manifests in
three interrelated tendencies: characterization of the lawyer as
expert and the law as solution; the de-valuation of non-lawyer/
client experience, knowledge, and problem-solving capability;
and the collapse of legal narratives into the lawyer's world view.
These tendencies cut the lawyer off from information which might
challenge the dominant assumptions of the law and the lawyer's
role, "undermin[ing] the very possibility for re-imagined social
arrangements that lies at the heart of any serious effort to take on
the status quo. 93
The first two tendencies are captured by what Lopez calls the
dominant or "regnant" view of lawyering.9 4 In this view, lawyers are
experts, characterized by their special ability for legal analysis; the
differing abilities of client communities are devalued, including
for the lawyer oriented toward the public interest.95 (Or, perhaps
92. SELLS, supra note 88, at 43.
93. LOPEZ, supra note 23, at 29.
94. Id. at 23-25.
95. Id.
Vol. 9:2
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more so, since subordinated communities are situated farther
from the professionalization process typified by law school).
The regnant view tends to value litigation over other forms of
problem-solving, a strategy which reinforces the characterization
of lawyer-as-expert.' Clients and client communities are not
seen as sources of information about how to approach problems,
formulate solutions, or develop resources for change. 7 Rather,
non-lawyer communications with the attorney may be seen as
cluttering the attorney-client relationship with useless information
and distractions. This reinforces the attitude that non-lawyers
are unfit to contribute to the important work of lawyering. 8 At
least until they are tutored by the lawyer, "about how to fit into a
productive lawyer-client relationship-about how to conform to
the ruling image."' 9
Clients also participate in the maintenance of the regnant
perspective. As L6pez points out, the regnant view of lawyering
exists in popular culture as well as the law school, which facilitates
its often seamless flow into the assumptions of the legal academy
and its burgeoning professionals. Thus it is also, to varying degrees,
understood by non-lawyers before they walk in the door of the
lawyer's office, although the lawyer may assist in the educative
process. For clients from subordinated groups, Lopez describes that
"[learning on the street, rather than through formal education,
provides ... reasons for acquiescing in the reign of this idea":
Street smart means, in part, handling yourself 'well'
in a professional (especially legal) culture-knowing
or at least quickly picking up what's going on,
96. Id.
97. Id
98. Id. at 27.
99. Id.
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what people do, how people act. Working generally
within the regnant idea, rather than fighting
clumsily against it, permits subordinated people to
be perceived somehow 'with it' rather than 'out of it',
knowledgeable rather than ignorant. Less enabled
than lawyers by the regnant idea, subordinated
people nevertheless tend to resign themselves to this
brand of law practice, perhaps as much to signal
what they do know and can learn as to hide from
any felt inadequacy. They may well be skeptical
about lawyers and law, but they like being seen as on
top of 'how to play the game.'1 0
In addition, in the quest for legal services there is a more
obvious motivation: the understanding that if one does not play
the lawyer's game, one might not get the needed legal service. In
the format of a client interview or other situations where problems
are framed and defined, acquiescing to the regnant view can take
the form of clients self-editing their stories, choosing to tell only
what they believe the lawyer will consider relevant. Or, clients
may simply not challenge the lawyer's method of eliciting and
interpreting their story.10 1 Whatever its form however, the result is
the reinforcement of a hegemonic view of the law and the lawyer,
for both lawyer and client.
The latter result stems from the fact that the lawyer not
only represents the client to the law, but represents the law to
the client. The educative role of the lawyer is another way in
which a person of the law can be an agent of social change. Just
as counter-hegemonic consciousness allows the lawyer to perceive
the limits and opportunities for change through the law, it enables
the client to resist hegemony. A lawyer can engender counter-
100. Id.
101. See Poverty Law Narratives, supra note 4, at 905.
Vol. 9:2
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hegemonic consciousness about the law by revealing the socially
constructed nature of law when counseling clients, by perceiving
and acknowledging the limits of the law in relation to the clients
needs and concerns, or the ways in which using the law may be
harmful to them.10 2 The regnant view of lawyering stifles this
exchange.
IV. Street Law: Creating a Different Story
Teaching law is another educative role for the lawyer, and can
be utilized as an opportunity for activist practice, which enriches
both teacher and student. However, unlike the typical academic,
the Street Law teacher is exposed to conditions of subordination
in an environment that may foster the consciousness and qualities
lost or undeveloped in law school.
Teaching Street Law is also different than other forms of
community law practice. The Street Law teacher operates away from
the constraints of legal service delivery; because the relationship
between teacher and student is not necessarily structured around
active legal dilemmas, there is potentially much more freedom to
formulate the goals of the interaction, and to share, question, and
shape narratives regarding the interrelationship of life and law.
Development of a pedagogy designed to foster the development of
counter-hegemonic consciousness would expand this opportunity
for the lawyer, and certainly for her students. However, aspects of
the Street Law experience hold potential for transformation of the
person in the law apart from any pedagogical reform.
102. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CON-
STRUCTION OF VICTIMS, (1988) (elaborating on the ways in which anti-dis-
crimination law may perpetuate the "bonds of victimhood" in the discrimina-
tion victim).
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First, working in an inner city high school classroom, the
Street Law teacher experiences the conditions of her students'
lives to a greater degree than lawyers experience the lives of their
clients in most practice settings. Her interactions with her students
are not in a setting controlled by her and are removed from the
students' daily life. This and the relatively time-intensive nature
of the student-teacher relationship (typically three or four hours a
week for three months) may be important in terms of developing
rapport and empathy between teacher and student.
No matter what identities the person of the law shares with
her students, the challenge is reconnecting with others alongside a
newer identification with the law; Street Law can build a pathway
for that connection. For teachers from a different background
than the students, however, connection with the students
involves establishing a relationship with a population she may
lack exposure to or have even avoided. For these teachers, the
Street Law experience can result in the overcoming of deeply held
stereotypes-additional barriers to the receipt of information
with which to critique hegemonic perspectives in the law. To
some degree, the high school students in the Street Law program
go through the same process with their teacher.
I reflected on this dynamic after inviting two students from
another law school to help me prepare my Street Law class for a
mock trial. The law students had been recommended to me by a
Street Law coordinator because of their interest in learning about
the program. When we met at Castlemont, I found two young
white women huddled nervously together outside the high school
entrance. I soon learned that they were both from suburban,
Midwestern backgrounds and had no previous experience with
the inner city and little experience with minority youth. I was
a bit anxious too: about how my guests would interact with,
Vol. 9:2
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and be received by, my students. Indeed, once in class, it was
interesting for me to see how warily my students received the
newcomers-for example, being unresponsive when they asked
questions, or directing their responses to me, and hesitating to go
with them when we used an empty portable to split into smaller
groups. Watching this, I realized how much trust must have been
developed between the class and me over the last several months,
a process I had not been consciously aware of at the time.
In spite of the rough start however, the class ended well. The
visitors were spunky and enthusiastic despite their nervousness,
and had prepared well for the cases we were reviewing. The
students in their group eventually warmed up to the project and
did well in our practice competition at the end of class. Afterwards,
I walked the two women off campus. They gushed happily about
the experience, their excitement palatable. "The students were
great!" one of them exclaimed. "Really, they are just like regular
high school students."
I hesitated, contemplating how to respond to her unstated,
perhaps unnoticed, reference point for "regular." It struck me that
the source of the women's excitement was linked to stepping over
a kind of boundary, a boundary mined with fear of the unknown
and categories of difference. I recognized myself in their energy.
I had overcome these boundaries too, and it was invigorating.
I also saw the irony embedded in the law student's remark. She
was broaching distance, and replacing difference, with allusions
to sameness; but by absorbing the Street Law students into
the "regularness" of her own experience, the opportunity for
learning from their experience was reduced. To the extent this
may be a common response to difference, at least for majority
group members, the potential for generating counter-hegemonic
consciousness through exposure to the lives of inner city youth
2008
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is minimized. Yet, reflecting on my Street Law experience, it
seemed it would be difficult to maintain the cycle of reducing
difference to sameness -in large part because teaching Street
Law contextualized difference in the lived conditions of its
production. Moreover, as discussed below, the students would
resist the tendency of reduction to sameness. I decided to let the
remark slide.
The Street Law classroom is different than the law school
classroom, and probably many other practice settings, in that the
level of conformity to the assumptions of the law is lower. This
does not mean the students will always disagree with the law's
perspective. Indeed, many Street Law teachers I spoke to were
surprised at the conservative viewpoints among their students;
like law students, Street Law students may experience marginality,
but any counter-hegemonic analysis of that experience may be
partial and tentative. Rather, the Street Law teacher's students are
less invested in proving themselves to the law than the typical law
school student or client. They have not left their community of
interests to attend an elite institution governed by its own rules;
the Street Law teacher is on their turf. Similarly, they differ from
a client in that they did not come to the lawyer with a problem.
This problem came to them. Thus, they have less pressure to
conform.103
As a result, the Street Law teacher is, conceptually speaking
as well as factually, outnumbered. In my experience and the
experience of other Street Law teachers I spoke with, the students
pepper the teacher with questions based on their own experience,
frequently challenging legal frameworks and assumptions head-
on in a way I never observed in law school. These challenges are
103. This is not to say the students have no pressure to conform, but that
such pressure may be less or different.
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often difficult to reconcile or assimilate into legal paradigms (and
the teacher will have less experience doing so than her law school
counterparts). These challenges stem in part from the students'
use of what Gilkerson calls "the everyday language of rights," a
language normally censored (perhaps largely self-censored) out of
the law school classroom.
As Gilkerson describes:
This... meaning of rights is more tentative and
colloquial, and is referred to spontaneously, often far
from legal institutions. There, rights are assertions
expressing self-definition and affirmation connecting
individual claimants to the larger community and
society... the experiential, everyday meaning of
rights encompasses the belief that one should not
be abused, mistreated, taken advantage of, harassed,
insulted, or denied access to the means for securing
life's necessities without adequate justification. 14
This more expansive view of rights is at odds with the law's
more rigid definitions. An example comes from a conversation
I had with several of my students about their perspectives on
discrimination. 1°5 Although I tried to focus our conversation
on employment discrimination, the students resisted locating
the issue in any concrete way. They described discrimination as
a continuum of unfairness, which sometimes overlapped with
legal concepts of basis, location, cause and effect, but was not in
any way fixed by those concepts. The ephemeral nature of this
understanding of discrimination makes it difficult to identify
104. Poverty Law Narratives, supra note 4, at 901.
105. I spoke with four Castlemont students on April 29, 1999 (two of whom
had been in my Street Law class), in preparation for writing this paper [herein-
after Castlemont Interview].
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the experience with any specificity.1 6 This stems in part from
the fact that, while the students' understanding shares with
anti-discrimination law a focus on the interpersonal nature of
discrimination, it views discrimination as something almost
everyone does, "because people think in stereotypes."'' 1 7 As one
student summarized:
Discriminating on anything, you're stopping [some-
one] from doing what they want to do because of
their race, color, whatever. Maybe because they don't
wear the same shoes as you; maybe because they
don't live on the same block as you. Discrimination
happens sometimes and you don't even know it .
...It's not always about race or color. It's about
anything. '08
The students' understanding of the injury of discrimination
differed from anti-discrimination law as well. For them, injury was
not limited to denial of right in a transaction (such as employment
or housing), but in denial of "your self' 09 Accordingly, their
remedy was not focused on "correcting" a transaction, but on
changing the perspectives which lead to discriminatory acts:
"That's the only way [to remedy discrimination]. You have to give
[people who discriminate] the other perspective ... let them get
to know each other; know how the other person feels."' 0 These
students' responses are remarkably similar to the results of research
106. This is true at least in the abstract. The students might well identify
particular examples of conditions or treatment as discriminatory that are not
necessarily suggested by their definition of discrimination.
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on adult legal consciousness."' This suggests that Street Law is an
opportunity for a person in the law to become familiar again with
the extra-legal language of rights which will be essential to hearing
what clients want and need, and to do so in a contextualized setting
where that language has more descriptive power. Moreover, while
lawyers can sometimes incorporate the everyday meanings of rights
into representation, oftentimes these meanings will simply not fit
into the law. Thus, Street Law is also an opportunity for a person
in the law to learn how to discuss the limits of the law in ways
which uphold the validity of extra-legal perspectives. Moreover,
insofar as the Street Law teacher not only educates students about
what the law is, she helps build an organizational framework for
ideas of right not recognized by law. The classroom is a laboratory
for counter- hegemonic consciousness and practice.
Development of a pedagogy which facilitates the formation
of counter-hegemonic consciousness would be informed by
the features associated with such consciousness: experience of
marginality, recognition of the social construction of legality (and
experience), and opportunities for meaningful storytelling. This
pedagogy would reveal legal narrative as narrative; train students
-and the lawyer-to notice perspective as social location; and
make room for alternative narratives based on lived experience.
The methodology of an alternative pedagogy would be subjectivity,
as understood in critical legal scholarship.
As Charles Lawrence describes, there are three interrelated
meanings of the term "subjective" which are central to critical
scholarship:
[s]ubjective, indicating the scholars' positioned
perspective in viewing and recording social constructs;
111. See, i.e. COMMON PLACE supra note 9, at 237-38.
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subjective, indicating nonneutrality of purpose, that
the scholar embraces certain values and that her work
is avowedly political ... ; subjective, indicating that
the scholar places herself in the linguistic position of
subject rather than object, as being capable of acting
upon the world rather than as one upon whom
others act.' 1
2
Subjectivity here is not the same as mere relativity; it is
more than "an acknowledgment of the existence and validity
of many different and competing perspectives."113 Rather, it
is the privileging of the perspectives of outsiders, based on the
"understanding that the dominant legal discourse is premised
upon the claim to knowledge of objective truths and the existence
of neutral principles."'1 14
By modeling the subjective viewpoint and encouraging it in
her students, the Street Law teacher can ground the classroom's
narrative elements. By helping students identify the position
of perspective, she makes this a political process. In this way, a
person of the law can facilitate the deconstruction and analysis
of experience, which is the cornerstone of true empowerment-
within or outside the law.
V. Conclusion
So, is legal text inedible? Perhaps not. Perhaps the problem
was that my fellow law students and I felt swallowed by the law.
As illustrated by anti-discrimination law, the paradox of lawyering
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for social change requires positioning oneself both inside and
outside the law. Being consumed by the legal perspective is a
loss of self and sight which stifles the creative engagement with
the world necessary for activist lawyering. Yet, this is a common
result of legal education. Community education projects such as
the Street Law are an opportunity for the lawyer to re-envision
the possibilities of legal education and the law, and develop the
tools necessary for the project of social change. By developing
counter-hegemonic consciousness within an individual and in
subordinated communities, a person of the law is both laying the
groundwork for that project, and making it happen.
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